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Thordis Arrhenius
The Fragile Monument:
On Alois Riegl’s Modern Cult of Monuments
Alois Riegl’s essay of 1903 “The Modern Cult of Monu- ments: Its Character and Its Origin” is unprece- 
dented in its attempt to speculate on the populari-
sation of heritage in western culture.1 Riegl identified 
age as the clue to the extension of heritage into mass-
culture. Age, signified through disintegration, mani-
fested itself immediately to the beholder; no scientific 
or art historical knowledge was needed to appreciate 
its visual qualities.2 Riegl saw this visual directness as 
the future potential of age in a mass-society directed, 
as he saw it, by moods and feelings, Stimmung, rather 
than rational thinking. Riegl’s age-value contains, as 
will be discussed further, an intriguing criticism of art 
history and its shortcomings in acknowledging the 
emotional force of the past in modern society. 
The Monument
Riegl opens his essay with a definition: “A monument”, 
Riegl writes, “in its oldest and most original sense is a 
human creation, erected for a specific purpose of keep-
ing single human deeds or events alive in the minds 
of future generations”.3 Riegl points out that the erec-
tion and care of such “intentional” commemorative 
monuments still exists and can be traced back to the 
beginning of human culture. And yet, Riegl suggests, 
these monuments are no longer central: 
... when we talk about the modern cult and preservation 
of monuments, we are thinking not about ’intentional’ 
monuments, but about monuments of art and history.4
However Riegl notes that even this definition of the 
monument is too reductive and does not acknowled-
ge that the concept of an absolute inviolable canon of 
art has successively given way to a modern relative 
“art-value”.5 Riegl argues that classification into either 
art-monuments or historical-monuments gives rise 
to misunderstandings, and the long and often con-
voluted text that follows this statement develops into 
a thorough search for the value of the monument in 
modern society.
As a foundation for his investigation of the “cult of 
monuments” Riegl uses his distinction between “inten-
tional” and “unintentional” monuments. Riegl saw the 
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development of heritage as a phenomenon closely con-
nected to a modern perception of history as caught in the 
knowledge that what has been can never be again: “Every-
thing that has been and is no longer we call historical”. 6 In 
this notion of the irreplaceability of every event, of the 
mortality of culture itself, modern man submits to ar-
tefacts left from a time that has passed. These cult ob-
jects consisted largely of unintentional monuments. 
Unintentional in so far as they where not erected with 
the purpose of commemorating any specific event or 
person but still monuments in their irreplaceable va-
lue for modern man.
With his concept of the unintentional monument 
Riegl makes a brutal expansion in the definition of a 
monument to incorporate every artefact without re-
gards to its original significance and purpose as long 
as it reveals the passage of a considerable period of 
time.7 Age becomes the sign that defines the object 
as a monument. In Riegl’s proposition the logic of the 
monument is turned upside down, fragility rather than 
permanence becomes its mark.
Age
However it is necessary to complicate the notion of age 
in order to grasp the shift from the cult of the intentio-
nal monument to the cult of the unintentional, which 
Riegl argues, characterises western history from the 
Renaissance. Age is a complex concept; it talks both of 
identification and distance. An intentional monument, 
erected to commemorate a human deed or event al-
ways has the purpose of overcoming distance to, in 
one sense, refuse the passage of time. With its physical 
presence it aims to create a lapse in time that renders 
the past present and establishes a transparent con-
nection to the event or the person that the monument 
commemorates. The intentional monument’s primary 
function according to Riegl, is to maintain memory 
alive; to arrest, one might say, the soft forgetfulness 
of history. For the intentional monument, therefore, 
age is always an obstacle. Indeed the intentional mo-
nument is dependent on a non-aged appearance to 
maintain its function as a memorial; any signs of de-
cay would suggest a diminishing interest in the sub-
ject whose presence in memory it governs.
 Riegl’s concept of the unintentional monument on 
the other hand suggests a radically different logic in 
which the enigma of absence is central. Where inten-
tional monuments in some sense always suppress loss 
through the articulation of triumph or martyrdom, 
these unintentional monuments leave loss at the cen-
tre. Not purposely built as monuments, they are found 
in the inflated realm of heritage as “historical objects” 
that reject a transparent presence in preference for an 
obscured and distant past. Riegl underlines that both 
the intentional and the unintentional monument are 
characterised by a commemorative value. Crucially, 
however, while the value of the intentional monument 
is always conditioned by its makers – the monument is 
cared for as long as the person or event it is to com-
memorate is still remembered – the value of the unin-
tentional monument is relative and, as Riegl points 
out, left to us to define: “when we call such works of art 
‘monuments’ it is a subjective rather than an objective 
designation” Riegl notes, continuing further: “we have 
defined the value of the unintentional ones.”8 This is a 
crucial observation and points to an important distinc-
tion between the intentional and the unintentional 
monument. While the intentional monument, purposely 
erected to commemorate, appears as a trans-historical 
almost ubiquitous phenomena, the unintentional mo-
nument is a datable invention of the west whose his-
tory and origin Riegl traces back to the Italian Renais-
sance.9 Riegl’s historical account of the “invention” of 
the unintentional monument can be questioned but 
his clear identification of the unintentional monument 
is, I would argue, crucial to understanding the phe-
nomena of heritage; particularly its explosive develop-
ment and expansion in western society.
Conservation
Riegl noted that we define the value of the uninten-
tional monument. In his highly visually orientated 
analysis the onlooker constructs the monument. Riegl 
abandoned the classification of the monuments them-
selves to instead identify and distinguish between va-
lues applied to them, and these values were almost ex-
clusively based on the visual effect of the monument 
upon the beholder.
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After his summary of the evolution in history from 
the cult of the intentional monument to the modern 
cult of unintentional monuments Riegl continues 
his essay by classifying and identifying the different 
values attributed to the monument, and speculates 
how these values determine the conservation of the 
monument. Should the monument be reconstructed 
to regain its completeness and coherence of form or 
should it be allowed to disintegrate, to return to natu-
re? Riegl’s answer to this question is that this depends 
on which value the monument in question has for the 
beholder. However, Riegl shows that these values often 
conflict and demand different kinds of conservation 
strategies for the same object.
Riegl distinguishes three forms of memory-valu-
es that effect the care of the monument: intentional 
commemorative-value (gewollte Erinnerungswert), 
historical-value (historische Wert) and age-value (Al-
teswert). The first, intentional commemorative-value 
relates only to the class of intentional monuments; the 
two last, historical-value and age-value, relate to the class 
of unintentional monuments and are therefore part 
of the “modern cult of monuments”. As the scope of 
memory-value widens the different classes of monu-
ments become contained within each other. The class 
of intentional monuments included only those works 
which recalled a specific moment from the past. The 
monuments to which a historical-value is designated 
still refer to a specific moment in history but they are 
unintentional in that the choice of monuments is left 
to our subjective preference. A monument that was 
originally “just” an intentional monument can therefo-
re be incorporated into this class if it is defined as being 
of historical worth. The class of monuments relating to 
age-value is even more expansive in its scope. As was 
noted earlier Riegl’s radical suggestion was that any 
artefact without regards to its original significance 
and purpose could gain an age-value that defined it 
as a monument as long as it revealed to the onlooker 
that a considerable period of time had passed since it 
was new.10
The three forms of memory-values, the Erinner-
ungswert identified by Riegl, all suggested different 
strategies of restoration. To maintain an intentional 
commemorative-value in the monument it had to be 
kept in a pristine state. Historical-value impinged on 
the monument defining a precise and authentic mo-
ment in history. The task of restoration was therefore 
to reconstruct the building back to its “original” state, 
which always risked jeopardising the validity of the 
monument as a historical document; the complication 
of conservation emerged with the notion of historical-
value. To possess an age-value it was required that the 
monument display “truthfully” the changes and evolu-
tions it had undergone since its construction, communi-
cating primarily the passage of time. Here restoration 
in itself was fundamentally problematic and was redu-
ced to preventative measures to protect the objects 
from the corrosive forces of nature or modernisation.
Riegl related the commemorative-values to the evo-
lution of history. He suggested that his classes of mo-
nument form three consecutive phases of what the 
monument had meant, and that these phases could 
be traced in the history of conservation. In his schema 
the development evolves from the cult of the intentio-
nal monument to the recognition of a historical-value 
in the monument. Riegl argued, in a lightly disguised 
criticism of pedantic art historical scholarship, that 
through the evolution of refined scholarship even the 
smallest particularity in the developmental chain be-
gan to be recognised as irreplaceable. This notion of 
the irreplaceability of every event would lead to the 
notion of developmental value in which the particulars 
were ultimately unimportant. The value of the monu-
ment would reside no longer in its historicity but in its 
capacity of revealing the process of development itself, 
the cycle of death and life. This appreciation of the pro-
cess of evolution, of the passage of time, Riegl termed 
age-value. This value was the result of the recognition 
of historical-value but at the same time would finally 
challenge and replace it.
According to Riegl’s prophecy age-value was the 
most modern value and the one that would guide the 
conservation of the monument in the future.11 However 
Riegl emphasised that the all embracing value of age 
had yet to come, and that the contemporary conflict 
in conservation was often played out between histo-
rical-value and age-value. Through his careful clas-
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sification and naming of different values he shows 
not only how different memorial-values conflict and de-
mand different strategies of conservation, but also how 
the memorial-values themselves are often antithetical 
to what Riegl named present-day-values (Gegenwarts-
werte).
Riegl acknowledged that the monument fulfilled 
other purposes relating not to commemoration but 
to use and aesthetic enjoyment. He noted that these 
present-day values were strictly speaking not part 
of the modern cult of monuments, as they deny the 
memorial function of the monument; and yet they ef-
fected the conservation of the monument none the 
less, and were therefore crucial to identify. He classi-
fied these present-day values into two main groups: 
use-value and art-value. The first group referred to the 
practical functional performance of the object,12 the 
second to its aesthetic value for the beholder. The use-
value of a monument tends to stand in conflict with 
the monument’s commemorative-value, both the his-
torical- but especially the more modern age-value.13 
While age-value emerges out of gradual dissolution, 
the dissolving of form and colour revealing the passa-
ge of time, use-value requires the maintenance of the 
object – the conflict is evident.
Riegl’s notion of art-value is more complex and clo-
sely related to his concept of Kunstwollen, the idea of 
a relative and changing notion of art specific to every 
period in history. Riegl claimed that to possess art-va-
lue it was necessary that the object was a discrete en-
tity, which revealed no decay of shape and colour; as 
Kurt W. Forster has noted Riegl had not identified the 
aesthetic category of the fragment.14 In Riegl’s schema 
art-value did not then necessarily conflict with historical-
value, even if these values were generated from diffe-
rent positions – the first in relation to the present-day 
value, the other from the commemorative-value of the 
monument. The identification of a historical-value in 
the monument had often resulted in the reconstruc-
tion of the object as new, and in its completeness and 
integrity it could therefore satisfy an art-value.
 Age-value on the other hand conflicted strongly 
with art-value. It was the very aging; the process of 
dissolution into the general that generated age-value 
and anything, independent of any previous aesthetic 
properties could gain it. Indeed, a monument that was 
appreciated for its age-value was nothing more than a 
catalyst which triggered in the beholder a sense of the 
life cycle. Age-value was not then bound up with the 
object. As Riegl dramatically expressed it: “the object 
has shrunk to a necessary evil”. 15 Indeed independent 
of either the historical or the aesthetic quality that had 
originally defined the unintentional monument, age-
value would fundamentally question the notion of the 
monument altogether. Art-value on the other hand 
was closely bound to the object. To satisfy both art-va-
lue and age-value in the same object was unfeasible: 
where the monument’s conception, shape, and colour 
satisfy our modern Kunstwollen, it follows that this va-
lue should not be allowed to diminish in significance in 
order to conform to the expectations of age-value.16
The strongest opposition to age-value, however is 
what Riegl terms newness-value (Neuheitswert). Riegl 
intriguingly and acutely places newness-value as a 
subclass to art-value. Riegl’s radical proposition is that 
the new always has an art-value; as he does with age, 
Riegl suggests that the new has a specific power in 
modern society. In its integrity and purity the new can 
be appreciated by anyone – no education is needed 
to appreciate its smooth and even surfaces, Riegl 
argues, anticipating Siegfried Giedion’s studies of the 
streamlined in 50s American modernism.17 In its di-
rectness the new is a force in the same way as age in a 
mass-society. And yet, the masses’ love for the new 
constitutes the largest hindrance to a general recog-
nition of age-value: 
The masses have always enjoyed new things […] 
What is rooted in thousands of years of perception 
– namely the priority of youth over age – cannot be eli-
minated in a few decades.18
The dichotomy between the attraction of the shiny 
new and the feeling for the aged structures Riegl’s ar-
gument in “The Modern Cult of Monuments”; for Riegl, 
writing on the brim of modernism, the attraction of the 
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new appeared stronger than that of the old. A century 
later the situation appears somewhat reversed; the 
comfort of the old and familiar dominates popular 
discourse, specifically perhaps in the realm of housing 
and urbanism whose rhetoric nearly without exception 
looks backwards. Riegl’s prophecy that the force of the 
old would conquer the masses seems to have been ful-
filled.
Riegl however saw the power of age as a potential 
for the new; the cult of the old would free the new from 
its historical burden. With truly modernistic ambition 
Riegl wanted to break with the historicism of the nine-
teenth century. He rejected the thought that the new 
could emerge from art historical studies.19 The new, he 
argued, had to gain its quality specifically by differen-
tiating itself from the old: “the truly modern work must, 
in its concept and detail, recall earlier work as little as 
possible“.20 As we have seen Riegl’s age-value placed 
the monument firmly in the realm of the old were it 
was isolated from the functionality and use of the eve-
ryday. The old were not to be directly reused but only 
to return to the present in the form of its otherness, as 
the cult of the old. The new on the other hand defined 
its newness by its very coherence with the present, its 
oneness with the time.
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